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The "Strict Liability" of Direct Patent
Infringement
Lynda J. Oswald*
ABSTRACT

In 1995, the Federal Circuit summarily attached the label of
"strict liability" to direct patent infringement, even though that term
does not appear in any US PatentAct enacted in the past two centuries.

The catechism of "strict"direct patent infringement liability is now so
well engrained in patent doctrine that it is easy to lose sight of how
recent the advent of this terminology is in the case law, and how
troublesome application of this standard has proven, even to the
Federal Circuit, which created it. The first Patent Act (1790) preceded
the emergence of tort law as a distinct field of US common law (mid1800s) by a half-century or more, and the products liability explosion of
the mid-twentieth century radically altered our understandingof strict
liability. The implications of this forgotten timeline are profound.
"Strict liability," particularly in its modern formulation, is not a
neutral, descriptive term. Rather, the term evokes social policy choices
and balancingconsiderations that may be appropriatewithin the case
law context of products liability or abnormally dangerous activities,
but which are incongruous and inapposite in the statutory context of
patent law. Deeming direct patent infringement to be "strict liability"
leads to two unanticipated and unwelcome effects. First, the adoption
of the "strict liability" label for direct patent infringement liability
improperly inflates the courts' role in setting direct patent infringement
liability standards and suggests-incorrectly-thatpatent liability is a
case law construct, when in fact it is a statutory construct. Second, the
Louis & Myrtle Moskowitz Research Professor of Business and Law, University of
Michigan, Ross School of Business. C 2016 Lynda J. Oswald. I would like to thank Daniel R.
Cahoy of the Penn State Smeal College of Business, Robert C. Bird of the University of
Connecticut School of Business, the participants of the 2016 Big 10 & Friends Business Law and
Ethics Research Seminar held at Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, and the
participants of the 2016 Huber Hurst Seminar, hosted by the University of Florida Warrington
School of Business, for their thoughtful and valuable comments.
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"strict liability" label improperly shifts the focus of the patent
infringement inquiry from the Patent Act's protection of the plaintiff's
exclusive property interest in its patent right toward a value-laden
examination of the social utility of the defendant's conduct vis-a-vis the
injury to the patent holder. Jettisoning the "strict liability" label for
direct patent infringement would reframe the analysis and debate,
moving direct patent infringement liability out of a policy framework
and back toward its proper statutory setting.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Is direct patent infringement liability a "strict liability"
standard? The reflexive answer to that question for the past two
decades has been "yes."
In 1995, the Federal Circuit, with no
elaboration or explanation, attached the label of "strict liability" to
direct patent infringement,' and lower federal courtS 2 and
1.
Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1527 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
2.
See, e.g., Potter Voice Techs., LLC v. Apple Inc., 24 F. Supp. 3d 882, 885 (N.D. Cal.
2014) ("Because patent infringement is a strict liability offense, the nature of the offense is
relevant only in determining whether enhanced damages are warranted." (quoting In re Seagate
Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007))); Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v.
Cardinal Indus., CV 95-4995 LGB (JGx), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17288, at *26 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3,
1998) ("[Platent infringement is a strict liability offense[.]" (citing Jurgen v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d
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commentators 3 followed suit without comment or inquiry. Today, the
catechism of "strict" direct patent infringement liability is so well
engrained in patent doctrine and case law that it is easy to lose sight
of how recent the appearance of the strict liability terminology is in
patent case law and how troublesome the strict liability standard is in
that context to the courts that must now employ it-including,
ironically, the Federal Circuit itself. 4
The Patent Act5 does not define direct patent infringement as
"strict liability." Rather, the statutory language eschews labels and
simply sets forth liability unconstrained by fault, intent, or knowledge
elements as the measure for such infringement: "[W]hoever without
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention,
within the United States, or imports into the United States any
patented invention during the term of the patent therefore, infringes
the patent."6
The adoption of the appellation "strict liability" for direct
patent infringement was not a mere inconsequential exercise in
Because of its close connection with the emergence of
semantics.
1566, 1570 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996) and Warner-Jenkinson, 62 F.3d at 1527)); On Demand Mach.
Corp. v. Ingram Indus., No. 4:01CV1668MLM, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29622, at *2 (E.D. Mo. July
23, 2004) ("Infringement is a strict liability offense and the court must award compensatory
damages regardless of the intent, culpability or motivation of the infringer."); Lee v. Accessories
by Peak, 705 F. Supp. 2d 249, 254 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) ("Because patent infringement is
'a strict liability offense,' the courts have found that intent is not an element of a direct
infringement claim, and neither ignorance of the patent nor good faith belief in non-infringement
is a defense to a charge of infringement under section 271(a)." (citing Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1368
and Warner-Jenkinson, 62 F.3d at 1527)); Tierra Intelectual Borinquen, Inc. v. ASUS Comput.
Int'l, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-38-JRG, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28249, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2014)
("Direct patent infringement is a strict liability cause of action and requires neither knowledge
nor specific intent on the part of an infringing defendant.").
See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, The Potential Extraterritoriality Consequences of
3.
Akamai, 26 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 499, 502 (2012); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent
System: A Reexamination, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 467, 558 (2015); Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent
Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1525, 1525 (2007); Matthew D.
Powers & Steven C. Carlson, The Evolution and Impact of the Doctrine of Willful Patent
Infringement, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53, 56 (2001); Jason A. Rantanen, An Objective View of Fault
in Patent Infringement, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1575, 1590 (2011); Christopher B. Seaman, Willful
Patent Infringement and Enhanced Damages After In re Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA
L. REV. 417, 421 (2012). This Author has also fallen prey to this practice in the past. See, e.g.,
Lynda J. Oswald, InternationalIssues in Secondary Liability for Intellectual PropertyRights, 45
AM. BUS. L.J. 247, 256 (2008).
See infra notes 122-72 and accompanying text (discussing Akamai Techs., Inc. v.
4.
Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam) (depublished),
rev'd & remanded, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014), on remand, 786 F.3d 899 (2015), rev'd, 797 F.3d 1020
(2015) (en banc) (per curiam)).
Patent Act of 1952, as amended, 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
5.
Id. Earlier patent acts reached a similar result, albeit with slightly different
6.
language. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
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products liability law in the 1960s and early 1970s,7 modern strict
liability carries a lot of baggage that colors the manner in which
courts and commentators view the causes of action to which it is
attached. The shortcomings of using this value-laden term for direct
patent infringement liability were made readily apparent in the
Federal Circuit's 2012 en banc decision on multi-actor infringement in
Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.8 ("2012 Akamai
en banc"). The en banc majority's effort to avoid what it felt was an
overly harsh standard of strict liability resulted in the adoption of a
liability rule for multi-actor patent infringement that was contrary to
both statute and precedent and that was quickly overturned by the
Supreme Court. 9
Why did the Federal Circuit attach the "strict liability" label to
direct patent infringement liability in 1995 and what are the
consequences of adopting this inapt terminology? The answers to
these questions lie in the ramifications of a forgotten timeline of
doctrinal development of patent law vis-A-vis tort law. The mantra of
modern patent law routinely recites that infringement of a patent is a
tort10 and that patent infringers are tortfeasors. 11
Those
classifications fit neatly into the framework of our modern legal
system in which tort doctrine is recognized as a foundational area of
common law. They also lead to the glib and ill-advised application of
tort
liability
vocabulary-e.g.,
"strict
liability"-to
patent
infringement inquiries, which in turn has led to incorrect patent
doctrine.
To understand where the Federal Circuit went astray in 1995,
one must understand the historical development and doctrinal

&

7.
See discussion on the development of strict products liability infra Part II.B.1.
8.
692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam) (depublished), rev'd
remanded, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014), on remand, 786 F.3d 899 (2015), rev'd, 797 F.3d 1020 (2015)
(en banc) (per curiam).
9.
See infra notes 125-72 and accompanying text (discussing Akamai).
10.
Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33 (1931); Akamai v.
Limelight Networks Inc., 786 F.3d 899, 905 (Fed. Cir. 2015), rev'd on other grounds, 797 F.3d
1020 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam); Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359,
1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Orthokinetics Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1579 (Fed.
Cir. 1986); H. Hume Mathews, Contributory Infringement and the Mercoid Cases, 27 J. PAT. OFF.
SOCY 260, 262 (1945) (referencing cases cited at 62 CORPUS JURIS. 1088) ("These statutes
expressly grant a 'right'; as it is a civil right an invasion thereof is a tort.'); Odin B. Roberts,
Contributory Infringement of Patent Rights, 12 HARV. L. REV. 35, 37 (1888); Michael L. Rustad,
Symposium: Does the World Still Need United States Tort Law? Or Did It Ever?, 38 PEPP. L. REV.
433, 514 (2011).
11.
See Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 648 (1915).
Infringement is viewed as a trespass upon the rights granted by the patent. See Samuel Ewer
Eastman, Contributory Infringement and the Combination Patent, 48 MICH. L. REV. 183, 184
(1949); Rustad, supra note 10, at 514.
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foundations of patent infringement liability and tort doctrine,
particularly strict liability. Oddly enough, this is not a topic that has
garnered the attention of courts or commentators to date, yet this
historical landscape continues to influence the parameters of modern
patent infringement liability doctrine.
This Article begins by examining the historical development of
patent and tort doctrine in US law. Tort law in general, and strict
liability in particular, is a relative latecomer to US law as compared to
the Patent Acts. Part II.A explores the property law foundations of
US patent law and the early development of patent infringement
standards, beginning with the very first patent statute, the Patent Act
of 1790, and the early case law. Part II.B reveals that US tort law in
general, and strict liability doctrine in particular, followed separate
paths and timelines of development. It was only in 1995 that direct
patent infringement and strict liability converged in Federal Circuit
case law. As Part III illustrates, this misalliance peaked in the 2012
Akamai en banc decision, 12 leading to the Federal Circuit's failed
attempt to rewrite patent law in an effort to avoid the harsh effects of
applying modern strict liability doctrine to direct patent infringement.
The ultimate question, of course, is why it matters if courts and
commentators have mislabeled direct patent infringement as a "strict
liability" offense. Part IV explores this issue, finding that the use of
the strict liability label has two deleterious consequences for patent
doctrine. First, the adoption of the strict liability label for direct
patent infringement liability improperly inflates the courts' role in
setting direct patent infringement standards, incorrectly intimating
that patent infringement liability is a case law construct, rather than
a statutory construct. Second, the strict liability label subtly but
insidiously implies that, rather than focusing solely upon the broad
protection of the patentee's property right mandated by the statutory
language of the Patent Act, the court may consider social policy
concerns, such as over-expansive imposition of liability, as mitigating
factors in evaluating a defendant's liability. 13 This reframing in effect
rewrites statutory patent infringement liability language that has
remained unchanged in substance, if not form, for over two centuries,
leading again to doctrinal erosion and disregard of the respective roles
of courts and Congress in setting patent infringement standards.

Akamai, 786 F.3d at 905.
12.
This is clearly illustrated by the majority opinion in the 2012 Akamai en banc
13.
decision. See infra notes 131-40 and accompanying text.
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II. THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF PATENT AND TORT DOCTRINE IN US LAW

Put succinctly, tort law is an anachronistic concept in the
context of statutory patent law. As Figure 1 below illustrates, the first
US Patent Act was enacted in 1790.14 Tort law did not emerge as a
foundational field of US law until the mid-1800s. Thus, the earliest
US patent statutes predate the emergence of tort law as a distinct
field of US law by a half-century or so. The drafters of the early
patent acts would not have thought of patent infringement in tort
liability terms for the simple reason that tort law did not exist as a
separate branch of American law at the time those drafters were
working out the original statutory parameters of patent law.
Moreover, the products liability law explosion of the mid-twentieth
century altered forever our view of strict liability, generating
extensive scholarly and judicial commentary on the social policy
choices and legal theories underlying this standard of liability. By the
time the Federal Circuit adopted the term "strict liability" to describe
direct patent infringement liability in 1995, the term had already
acquired connotations that were as firmly fixed in the legal lexicon as
they were inapt in the patent law context.

0

1995;
Federal Crcuit first
labels DPt "strIct
liability

1952:
Current US Patent
Act

1790:l
first US Patent Act

0
MId-180Ds:
Tort law emerge.

0

0
19150s:
Strict produets
liability law emerges

0

0
2015:
Supreme Court first
adapts' stict
llabIlity term for DP

FIGURE 1: TIMELINE OF DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENTS

15

This timeline of doctrinal developments seems to have been
forgotten in modern patent law, and the consequences of that
doctrinal elision are profound.
Had the Federal Circuit fully
considered the ramifications of the relatively late appearance of tort
law as compared to patent statutes in US legal doctrine, it might have
14.
Act of Apr. 10, 1790, 1 Stat. 109. The 1790 Act was quickly replaced by the Patent
Act of 1793. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, 1 Stat. 318.
15.
"DPI" stands for "direct patent infringement."
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been more reticent in 1995 in adopting the simplistic shorthand of
"strict liability" to describe direct patent infringement-and patent
infringement liability doctrine would rest on sounder theoretical
ground today.
A. The Development of Direct Patent Infringement Liability
Modern scholars vigorously debate whether patents are properly
regarded as "property." 16 However, modern case law17 and the current
Patent Act1 8 do not evidence similar uncertainty: in the eyes of the
courts and the legislature, patents are property.
More importantly, drafters of the first US patent acts and early
courts, working largely within the framework they inherited from
British systems,1 9 clearly viewed patent law as a form of property
law 2 0 and protected patents accordingly. A rigorous exploration of the
historical relationship between patents and property led Mossoff to
conclude that "early American court opinions, legislative debates and
treatises reveal that patents were defined and secured in the law as
fundamental civil rights securing property rights." 21 As he explained:
There was widespread agreement among judges and lawyers, for instance, that
common law property concepts and doctrines applied to patents. Early American
courts defined patents as "title deeds," identified multiple co-owners of patents as
"tenants in common," and expressly incorporated common law property doctrines
into patent law, such as securing to patent-owners the same conveyance rights
In
already secured to property owners in "assignments" and "licenses."
adjudicating patent disputes, early courts cited to and relied on common law
property cases as a determinative precedent. They also adopted property rhetoric
in patent cases, referring to infringers as "pirates" and regularly instructing juries
in patent infringement trials that "[a]n inventor holds a property in his invention
22
by as good a title as the farmer holds his farm and flock."

16.

See Adam Mossoff, Introduction to INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PROPERTY RIGHTS,

at ix (Adam Mossoff ed., 2013) (summarizing literature).
See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expenses Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S.
17.
627, 642 (1999) ("Patents ... have long been considered a species of property.").
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012) ("[Pjatents shall have the attributes of personal
18.
property.").
EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN
19.
PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, 1798-1836, at 3 (1998).
See, e.g., WILLIAM P. KOOKOGEY, PATENT LAW IN BRIEF 11 (1884) ("Patents in this
20.

country are not subject to the will of any ruler, but are recognized as property of the highest
character.").

21.
22.

Mossoff, supra note 16, at xi.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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In short, Mossoff found, early courts "relied on and employed
concepts, doctrines, and rhetoric from real property in crafting the
doctrines that now comprise the American patent system," 23 viewing
patent infringement as "an unlawful invasion of property" 24 and thus
akin to a "trespass" to land. 2 5

Trespass, and the role of writs as the basis for trespass actions,
played a key role in early understandings of patent infringement
liability. 2 6

The early US legal system was based upon the English

common law; early English common law in turn grounded remedies
for wrongs in the issuance of writs used to bring the defendant before
the court. As Prosser and Keeton noted in their leading tort treatise,
the system was rigid: "The number of such writs available was very
limited, and their forms were strictly prescribed; and unless the cause
of action could be fitted into the form of some recognized writ, the
plaintiff was without a remedy." 27 Although the rigidity of "this highly
formal and artificial system of procedure" eased over time, 28 the writ
system itself persisted, leading Prosser to conclude that "[a]t the
beginning of the nineteenth century [writs] still existed, although
somewhat blurred in their outlines, as the core of common law
procedure. "29

The two writs available for remedies for what today would be
seen as purely tortious behavior were the actions of trespass (for "all
forcible, direct and immediate injuries, whether to person or to
property") 30 and trespass on the case (intended to address wrongful
conduct that resulted in injuries that "were not forcible or not

23.
Adam Mossoff, The Trespass Fallacy in Patent Law, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1687, 1692
(2013) (footnote omitted).
24.
Gray v. James, 10 F. Cas. 1019, 1021 (C.C.D. Pa. 1817) (cited in Mossoff, supra note
16, at xi).
25.
See, e.g., United States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262, 269 (1888) (analogizing patent
infringement to an intentional and continued trespass on land). See generally Adam Mossoff,
Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent "Privilege"
in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 993 n.192 (2007) (listing cases). Early
commentators also employed this term. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 10, at 40; Chauncey Smith,
Amendment of the Patent Law, 12 AM. L. REV. 205, 213 (1878); James J. Storrow, Money
Recoveries in Patent Suits, 13 AM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1878).
26.
A concise history of trespass can be found in Charles 0. Gregory, Trespass to
Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359 (1951).
27.

W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS,

§ 6,

at 29 (5th

ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
28.
Id.
29.
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 19 (1941); see also G.
EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 8 (2003) (footnote omitted)

(noting that until the mid-1800s, tort law was "a collection of unrelated writs").
30.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 27, § 6, at 29.
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direct"). 31 Trespass emerged in the thirteenth century and "had a
basic criminal character," arising out of breaches of the peace. 32
Trespass on the case was a later development, first appearing in
printed cases in the fourteenth century. 33
While trespass on the case requires wrongful intent or
negligence, 34 trespass itself was originally conceived of as a liability
Where interference with exclusive
without fault or intent. 3
possession occurred, regardless of the defendant's culpability, liability
ensued, even in the absence of actual harm to the plaintiff. 3 6 Although

that standard may seem odd to our modern sensibilities, as Peck
explained, it was not viewed as harsh in a pre-industrialized, premechanized society, as it "did not have a disruptive effect upon
society, and did not deter or misdirect otherwise desirable economic
activity." 37
Federal authority to regulate patents arose from the Intellectual
Property Clause of the US Constitution, which gave Congress the
power to grant "for limited times . . . to inventors the exclusive right to
their .

.

. discoveries." 38

Congress enacted the first Patent Act in

Id. Prosser and Keeton illustrate the difference using the "classic" example of a log
31.
thrown into a roadway. A person injured by the log as it fell would have an action in trespass
against the thrower, while a person who incurred an injury from tripping over the log would
have an action on the case. Id. (footnote omitted); see also FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES,
JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS § 1.3, at 7 (3d ed. 2015) (noting that

"from this writ [of trespass] most of the law of torts has grown").

§ 6,

at 29.

32.

PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 27,

33.

See Elizabeth Jean Dix, The Origins of the Action of Trespass on the Case, 46 YALE

L.J. 1142, 1164 (1937).

PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 27, § 6, at 30.
34.
Id.; see also FRANCIS M. BURDICK, THE LAW OF TORTS ch. XI, at 338 (1905) (footnotes
35.
omitted) (citing, inter alia, Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. 381 (N.Y. 1822); Higginson v. York, 5 Mass.
341 (1809)) ("innocence and good faith will not protect" the trespasser); HARPER, JAMES & GRAY,
supra note 31, § 1.3, at 8 ("The test for trespass came to be whether a defendant's voluntary
conduct directly invaded the plaintiffs person or property, and this test was applied to
inadvertent or accidental invasions as well as intentional ones."); Page Keeton, Trespass,
Nuisance, and Strict Liability, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 464-65 (1959) ("Historically, the
requirements for common law trespass were that the invasion was a direct result of the

defendant's act and interfered with plaintiffs interest in the exclusion possession of his land.
There was no requirement of either fault or harm."). There were some excuses to liability, such

as self-defense or effecting a lawful arrest. See HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 31,
131-32.
36.

PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 27,

§ 6,

§

12.2, at

at 30.

Cornelius J. Peck, Negligence and Liability Without Fault in Tort Law, 46 WASH. L.
37.
REV. 225, 229 (1971).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Prior to then, the colonies had issued patents, and
38.
remnants of state patent law persisted into the early 1800s. See EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE
NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 777
(2002).
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1790,39 followed in quick succession by the Acts of 1793,40 1800,41 and
1836,42 and culminating in the current act, the Patent Act of 1952.43
Patents initially were viewed as "writ[s] granting an exclusive
privilege," 44 in keeping with the common law's requirement that
remedies flow from writs. In addition, from the beginning, the patent
acts grounded direct patent infringement liability in intrusion into the
exclusive rights of the patentee, and provided no grounds on which
such intrusion would be excused. For example, the Patent Act of 1790
provided:

.

[I]f any person or persons shall devise, make, construct, use, employ, or vend
within these United States ... any Invention ...
the sole and exclusive right of
which shall be so as aforesaid granted by Patent to any person or persons, . .
without the Consent of the Patentee or Patentees, . . . every person so offending
shall forfeit and pay to the said Patentee or Patentees . . . such damages as shall be
assessed by a jury ... .4

No provision was made for excusing the defendant's liability for lack of
intent or knowledge. Certainly, early drafters knew how to provide for
an explicit fault or intent standard when they wanted such. When the
Patent Act of 1793 was being debated, for example, a bill, H.R. 121,
would have provided for several affirmative defenses, including a
provision that those who infringed a patent without knowledge of it
would not be held liable, "[ajnd any person making or selling the thing
so invented as aforesaid shall be liable to an action at law . . . unless
he can shew on like grounds that he did not know that there existed
an exclusive right to the said invention . . . ."46 The bill was not
enacted, and this proposed affirmative defense faded from history.
Subsequently, Section 15 of the 1836 Act set forth a number of
defenses that the alleged infringer could raise, but lack of knowledge
or intent was not among those listed. 47
Court decisions from the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries analyzed patent infringement in terms of liability without
109.
318.
37.
117.
Act of 1952, as amended, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2012).

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

1 Stat.
1 Stat.
2 Stat.
5 Stat.
Patent

44.

WILLARD PHILLIPS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS 2 (1837)

(emphasis

omitted).
45.
Patent Act of 1790, § 4, 1 Stat. 109 (emphasis added). The Patent Act of 1793, § 5, 1
Stat. 318, and the Patent Act of 1800, § 3, 2 Stat. 37, had similar language.
46.
H.R. 121, 1st Cong. ¶ 2 (1791) (emphasis added) (reproduced in WALTERSCHEID,
supra note 19, at App'x VI).
47.
Patent Act of 1836, § 15, 5 Stat. 117.
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fault or intent. 48 In Pirkl v. Smith, for example, the trial court noted
that ignorance of the existence of a patent did not relieve a
manufacturer of liability for infringement. 49 In Parker v. Hulme, the
court stated: "The defendant may have infringed without intending, or
even knowing it; but he is not, on that account, the less an infringer."5 0
Similarly, in Matthews v. Skates, the court noted that a defendant
"might not even know there was such a patent, and yet infringe on
51
In Thompson v. N.T. Bushnell Co., the court found that liability
it."
attached even where the infringement was claimed to be accidental. 52
In Bate Refrigerating v. Gillett, the court grounded the patent liability
standard in the old adage that all are assumed to know the law: "The
allegation that the defendants were ignorant of the existence of the
patent is, of course, no defense. The patent was a public record, of
which all persons were bound to take notice."53
The early US Supreme Court took a similar stance. In 1850, the
Court found that direct infringement liability would attach even in the
absence of intent, noting that "[t]he intent not to infringe . . . never
exonerates . . . from all damages for the actual injury or

encroachment, though it may mitigate them." 54 In 1854, the Court
48.

See, e.g., Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Silica Prods. Co., 48 F.2d 503, 508 (8th Cir. 1931)

(purpose and intent of infringer are immaterial in determining infringement); Kawneer Mfg. Co.

v. Toledo Plate & Window Glass Co., 232 F. 362, 367 (E.D. Mich. 1915) ("The defendant's
intention . . . has nothing to do with the question of infringement so long as it sold the infringing
devices." (citations omitted)). We do not have records of the decisions made under the earliest
patent acts. Walterscheid noted that "[a]lthough there is indirect evidence of infringement
actions" being brought soon after the 1790 Act took effect, there is only one known, recorded
opinion involving a patent issued under that Act, and the patent itself (which was partially
invalidated in the opinion) is lost. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 19, at 158-59. He further noted
that there were no reported patent cases in the United States until the early years of the
nineteenth century, id. at 355, and only fifty-eight reported or referenced cases at the circuit
court level through 1835, id. at 359. It is impossible to know for certain how many patent cases
were decided at the trial or circuit court level through 1836, because cases were not routinely
reported during this time period. Id. at 361.
42 F. 410, 411 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1890) ("[T]he statute does not include knowledge of the
49.
patent among things necessary to create . . . liability."); see also Royer v. Coupe, 29 F. 358, 361
(C.C.D. Mass. 1886) (holding that an infringer "cannot excuse himself by alleging or by providing
even, if he can prove it, that he was not aware of rights of the patentee").
18 F. Cas. 1138, 1143 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849).
50.
16 F. Cas. 1133, 1135 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1860).
51.
96 F. 238, 243 (2d Cir. 1899) ("[T]he owner of a patent is entitled to protection
52.
against the repetition of accidental infringements.").
31 F. 809, 816 (C.C.D.N.J. 1887). This manner of describing patent infringement by
53.
its effects rather than a label persisted into the mid-twentieth century. See, e.g., Blair v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 291 F. Supp. 664, 670 (D.D.C. 1968) ("It is, of course, elementary, that
an infringement may be entirely inadvertent and unintentional and without knowledge of the
patent.").
Hogg v. Emerson, 52 U.S. 587, 607-08 (1850).
54.
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remarked upon the injustice of an innocent or good faith infringer
being held liable for enhanced damages in the same manner that a
"wanton and malicious pirate" would be.5 5 However, the Court did not
object to the imposition of liability itself upon the innocent infringer,
but rather the trebling of damages that was automatically required
under the 1793 and 1800 Patent Acts. 56
By contrast, the earliest patent law commentators did not
address the lack of an intent or knowledge element for direct patent
infringement. For example, the first US treatise on patent law,
written by Fessenden in 1810, did not discuss this aspect of patent
infringement liability, nor did Phillips's 1837 treatise, which simply
acknowledged the "exclusive" nature of a patent.5 7 The dearth of
scholarly commentary on the liability-without-fault standard of direct
patent infringement suggests that this standard was not viewed at the
time as unusual, harsh, or even noteworthy.
By the late nineteenth century, commentators began explicitly
acknowledging the lack of an intent or knowledge element in direct
patent infringement, but they accepted this state of affairs matter-offactly and merely described it, without analyzing or justifying it.
Thus, Walker, in his 1883 treatise, stated: "To constitute an
infringement of a patent, it is not necessary that the infringer should
have known of the existence of the patent at the time he infringed it;
or, knowing of its existence, it is not necessary that he should have
known his doings to constitute an infringement."5 8
Similarly,
Robinson, in his leading patent treatise of 1890, noted that a patentee
"can prohibit the enjoyment of the invention to all persons
whomsoever, even although they are original inventors like himself"59
and that "the intention with which an act of infringement is performed
is immaterial."6 0 In 1911, Hopkins wrote that "the fact that the
alleged infringer had no knowledge of the patent at the time of the

55.
Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480, 488 (1854).
56.
Id.; see also Patent Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 318 § 5 (setting damages at "three times the
price, for which the patentee has usually sold or licensed to other persons, the use of said
invention"); Patent Act of 1800, 2 Stat. 37 § 3 (setting damages at "three times the actual
damage sustained by such patentee"). The Patent Act of 1793 had not contained a treble
damages measure, and the Patent Act of 1836 simply provided that the jury would "assess actual
damages," with the court having discretion to enhance damages up to three times that amount.
Patent Act of 1836, § 14, 5 Stat. 117.
57.
PHILLIPS, supra note 44, at 2.
58.

ALBERT H. WALKER, TEXT-BOOK OF THE PATENT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA § 377, at 292 (1883) (footnotes omitted).
59.

§ 848

3 WILLIAM CALLYHAN ROBINSON,

(1890) (footnotes omitted).
Id. § 901.
60.

THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS
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alleged infringing acts, is no defense to the charge of infringement,"
nor is the fact "that the defendant has submitted the alleged
infringing device to experts and been advised that it did not
infringe."6 1
The emergence of scholarly acknowledgment of the patent
liability standard coincided with the evolution of tort law in US legal
doctrine. Perhaps as courts and commentators became increasingly
concerned with the appropriate liability standard to apply to newly
defined tortious behavior that resulted in harm to persons and
property, that environment of heightened scrutiny and analysis of
liability standards enticed patent commentators to more explicitly
articulate the liability standards associated with patent infringement
All we can say for certain, however, is that while
as well.
commentators described patent infringement liability standards in
greater detail in this time period, they did not analyze the theoretical
bases or justifications for such liability in any detail.
B. The Emergence of Tort Law and Strict Liability
It is hard for a modern legal scholar, steeped in the prominent
role that tort doctrine plays in contemporary American law, to fully
grasp just how exceptional-and dubious-the concept of tort was
during the mid-1800s. White, in his study of the intellectual history of
American tort law, highlighted the late arrival of tort on the American
legal landscape: "The first American treatise on Torts appeared in
1859; Torts was first taught as a separate law school subject in 1870;
the first Torts casebook was published in 1874."62 Prosser and Keeton
provided two additional examples illustrating the same point: first,
when Joel Bishop, a leading nineteenth century legal scholar, 63
proposed to write a book on tort law in 1853, he was told by publishers
that there was no market for such a book and that "if the book were
written by the most eminent and prominent author that ever lived,
not a dozen copies a year could be sold."64

Second, the "leading"

American law journal of the time stated in 1871, "We are inclined to
think that Torts is not a proper subject for a law book." 6 5

1 JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE LAW OF PATENTS § 274, at 341-42 (1911) (footnote
61.
omitted).
62.
WHITE, supra note 29, at 3.
63.
See Stephen A. Seigel, "Bishop, Joel Prentiss," in YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY
OF AMERICAN LAW 47 (2009).
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 27, § 1, at 1 n. 1 (citation omitted).
64.
Id. § 1, at 1 (citing 5 AM. L. REV. 341 (1871)).
65.
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It was not until the 1850s, when the ancient writ system was
gradually being supplanted in most states by modern procedural
codes, 66 that torts began to emerge as a "distinct branch of law," 6 7
spurred on by both the exigencies of rapid industrialization and the
evolution of jurisprudential theory. 68 The development of tort law was
continuous but uneven over the next four decades, and tort law finally
gained status as "a discrete branch of law" in the late 1800s. 6 9
The emergence of tort law signaled a notable change in
American legal philosophy. 70 Courts increasingly realized that the
public interest played an important role in the development of tort
doctrine, both in terms of ensuring a sound body of precedent and in
terms of promoting the interests of society overall.7 1 While the
primary objective of tort law was to fairly resolve disputes between
opposing partieS 72 and the critical inquiry was "whether something
about the circumstances of the plaintiffs injury compelled the
defendant to pay the plaintiff damages," 73 this inquiry was recognized
as having broader social implications as well, such as ensuring that
individuals resolved their disputes peaceably in the courts rather than
through "private vengeance." 74
In particular, there was a growing movement toward employing
"fault" or "moral responsibility" as the touchstone for evaluating
wrongdoing and the availability of remedies. 7 5 However, the "fault" at
issue was viewed in terms of "social morality," not personal moral
blameworthiness. 76 As Prosser explained, "fault," in legal terms,
meant "no more than a departure from the conduct required of a man
by society for the protection of others, and it is the public and social
interest which determines what is required."77 That public interest
encompassed a significant desire for economic growth. The movement
away from the liability-without-fault standard of the traditional writ
of trespass to a negligence-based standard for tort was thus in large
66.
See PROSSER, supra note 29, § 4, at 19; WHITE, supranote 29, at 10.
67.
PROSSER & KEETON, supranote 27, § 1, at 1.
68.
WHITE, supra note 29, at 3.
Id.
69.
70.
PROSSER, supra note 29, § 3, at 15. White outlined this process in WHITE, supra note
29, ch. 2.
71.
PROSSER, supra note 29, § 3, at 17.
Id.
72.
73.
WHITE, supra note 29, at 14.
74.
PROSSER, supra note 29, § 56, at 426.
75.
Id. at 427. Tort liability based upon "fault" is commonly traced to Brown v. Kendall,
60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850). See generally WHITE, supra note 29, at 14-16.
76.
PROSSER, supra note 29, § 4, at 21.
Id.
77.
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part stimulated by the desire to promote industrialization and the
growth of commerce by creating "immunities from legal liability ...
thereby to provide substantial subsidies for those who undertook
schemes of economic development." 78

It is worth pausing here to consider the role of patent law in the
industrialization goals of the country during this period. While the
liability-limiting standard of negligence was seen as important to the
economic growth of the country, the patent acts continued to impose a
liability-without-fault standard for infringement. These two positions
were in no way inconsistent, however, as strong protection of inventive
efforts (via strong patent laws) was also seen as a critical contributor
As Walterscheid pointed out in his
to economic development.
foundational work on the history of the Intellectual Property Clause,
the origins of this clause are murky.7 9 Walterscheid speculated,
however, that the delegates to the Constitutional Convention copied
the English practice of granting exclusive rights for patents and
copyrights, and that they did so for "purely a pragmatic" reason: a
newly born, poor national government, facing extensive debt from the
Revolutionary War, adopted an approach that would encourage the
desired growth of manufacturing and knowledge but at less cost than
other schemes being contemplated, "while at the same time providing
the desired pecuniary incentive to inventors and authors."80 In short,
the early Congresses likely viewed the liability-without-fault standard
of the patent acts as a way of supporting nascent industry and
furthering the national goal of economic development, and would not
have seen that standard as being in conflict with emerging tort law.
1. The Historical Evolution of Strict Liability
Although notions of fault began to dominate torts theory in the
late nineteenth century,8 1 liability without fault was retained for
certain wrongs and injuries, 82 including liability for injuries caused by
trespassing animals or by the keeping of wild animals. 83 Initially,
these liability actions were considered extraordinary forms of actions.
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 100
78.
(1977); see also LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 300 (2d ed. 1985); Gregory,

supra note 26, at 365.
79.

WALTERSCHEID, supra note 38, at 83.

Id. at 91; see also B. Zorina Khan, Property Rights and Patent Litigation in Early
80.
Nineteenth-CenturyAmerica, 55 J. ECON. HIST. 58 (1995).
See PROSSER, supra note 29, § 56, at 427-28; WHITE, supra note 29, at 12-19.
81.
WHITE, supra note 29, at 108.
82.
See PROSSER, supra note 29, § 57.
83.
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White, for example, noted that Burdick's 1926 seminal treatise on
torts categorized these actions under the heading of "peculiar
liability," 8 4 highlighting their exceptional nature.
Courts initially were wary of the strict liability standard and
were hesitant to adopt it.85 The strict liability principle of Rylands v.
Fletcher,86 for example, was unpalatable to many early American
courts as it seemed to impose inordinate liability upon a young
country struggling to industrialize.8 7 Thus, in Brown v. Collins,88 the
New Hampshire Supreme Court rejected the natural/non-natural use
of land distinction made by Lord Cairns in Rylands, stating such a
rule "would impose a penalty upon efforts, made in a reasonable,
skillful, and careful manner, to rise above a condition of barbarism. It
is impossible that legal principle can throw so serious an obstacle in
the way of progress and improvement." 89 Similarly, in Losee v.
Buchanan,90 the New York Court of Appeals rejected strict liability for
property damage caused by a steam boiler explosion, stating:
We must have factories, machinery, dams, canals, and railroads.
They are
demanded by the manifold wants of mankind, and lay at the basis of all of our
civilization. If I have these on my lands, and they are not a nuisance and are not
so managed as to become such, I am not responsible for any damage they
91
accidentally and unavoidably do my neighbor.

By the 1930s, however, the pendulum had swung the other way.
Scholars began to identify strict liability as a separate and
independent category of torts, as opposed to a collection of exceptions
to negligence liability, 92 a change that arose out of the growing sense
that tort law was indeed "an instrument of social policymaking." 93
This also led commentators to explore the theoretical bases for strict

84.

WHITE, supra note 29, at 108 (citing FRANCIS BURDICK, THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 67,

at

536 (4th ed. 1926)). Earlier editions of Burdick's treatise did discuss the liability of those engaged
in "extra hazardous activities," see FRANCIS BURDICK, THE LAW OF TORTS 445 (1906), but found

that the broad doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher was generally not adopted in American courts, id.
at 447, and that absolute liability was applied only in "exceptional" cases, id. at 449.
85.

WHITE, supra note 29, at 110.

86.
L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
87.
See Virgina E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Revitalization of Hazardous Activity
Strict Liability, 65 N.C. L. REV. 257, 260-63 (1987) (discussing reaction of American courts to
Rylands).
88.
53 N.H. 442 (1873).
Id. at 448.
89.
90.
51 N.Y. 476 (1873).
91.
Id. at 484-85.
92.

WHITE, supra note 29, at 109.

93.

Id.
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liability. For example, Harper, in his 1933 treatise, argued that the
objective of strict liability was "allocating a probable or inevitable loss
in such a manner as to entail the least hardship upon any individual
and thus to preserve the social and economic resources of the
community." 94 Similarly, Prosser devoted a section of his 1941
treatise to the discussion of strict liability, examining several
categories to which strict liability was applied, including injuries
caused by animals, fire, and "dangerous things and activities."9 5 He
noted that there was "a general acceptance of the principle that the
defendant may be liable, although he not only is charged with no
moral wrongdoing, but has not departed in any way from a reasonable
standard of intent or care." 96 The strict liability standard was a way
of ensuring that the costs of such dangerous undertakings were borne
by the public, not by the injured plaintiff.9 7 The defendant, who
presumably would benefit from the pursuit of the dangerous activity
(or he or she would not pursue it), was in a position to spread the risk
of harm (e.g., by charging slightly higher prices to each of his or her
customers) and that risk-spreading was fairer than imposing the
entire cost on the injured party. 98 As Prosser summed it up, the strict
liability defendant, "although he departs in no way from ordinary
standards, must proceed 'at his peril,' and his conduct is regarded as
tortious, not because it is morally or socially wrong, but because as a
matter of social engineering the responsibility must be his." 99
At the same time, courts began adopting strict liability for
injuries resulting from unusually dangerous conditions or activities, 100
reflecting a growing sense that while the defendant's activity might
have social utility and hence should not be banned outright, fairness
dictated that the defendant should bear the costs of any loss caused by
the undertaking of the activity. 10 1 Then, between the 1940s and the
early 1970s, there was an explosion of interest, judicial and scholarly,
94.

FOWLER V. HARPER, THE LAW OF TORTS 334 (1933) (quoted in WHITE, supra note 29,

at 109).
95.
PROSSER, supra note 29, § 59. Prosser also noted that "[t]he principle of strict
liability [was] being extended, both by statute and by the common law, into other fields," id. at
466, citing the Federal Safety Appliance Act, the Uniform Aeronautics Act, child labor laws,
dramshop acts, and pure food acts, id. at 467-68.
Id. § 56, at 428.
96.
97.
Id. at 439 (strict liability was intended to "allocat[e] a more or less inevitable loss to
be charged against a complex and dangerous civilization, and [to place] liability . . . upon the
party best able to shoulder it").
See id. at 429.
98.
Id. at 430.
99.
100.
See Nolan & Ursin, supra note 87, at 264.
101.
PROSSER, supra note 29, § 56, at 429.
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in strict products liability, spurred in large part by Judge Traynor's
concurrence in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. in 1944, in which he
argued for absolute liability for product defects on public policy
grounds, 102 and by Prosser's 1960 groundbreaking article, The Assault
Upon the Citadel, in which he advocated the expansion of strict
liability for product defects. 103 These two pivotal works were followed
by several influential state court opinions in the 1960s and early
1970s, 104 as well as the drafting of Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which broadened the notion of strict liability for
product defects and for which Prosser was the reporter.1 0 The growth
of strict products liability law was rapid and expansive, and it quickly
became, in the words of one commentator, the "quintessential torts
creature of the twentieth century."10 6
2. Modern Strict Liability Doctrine
The rise of products liability in the latter half of the twentieth
century gave birth to a robust body of literature exploring and
identifying the rationales for strict liability, 107 both in the products
102.
150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
103.
William Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
104.
See, e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974); Goldberg v.
Kollsman Instrument Corp., 191 N.E.2d 81 (N.Y. 1963); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 377
P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
105.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
106.
MARSHALL S. SHAPO, SHAPO ON THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 7.01, at 703
(2012).
In addition, there seemed to be a shift in liability definitions in the mid-twentieth
107.
century. Prior to the 1960s, the commentary suggested that "absolute" and "strict" liability were
synonymous (with the latter being perhaps the more "modern" term). See Walter H.E. Jaeger,
The Warranty of Habitability, 47 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1970). For example, Ehrenzweig
seemed to equate "strict" and "absolute" liability in the early 1950s, but then concluded that
"[t]he term 'strict liability' now seems to be generally preferred." Albert A. Ehrenzweig,
Negligence Without Fault, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1422, 1450 n.1 (1966) (reprint of an article from 1951);
see also Robert W. James, Comment, Absolute Liability for Ultrahazardous Activities: An
Appraisal of the Restatement Doctrine, 37 CAL. L. REV. 269, 270 n.4 (1949) ("Although the term
'absolute liability' will be used through this comment to conform to the terminology of the
Restatement of Torts, the terms 'strict liability' or 'liability without fault' appear somewhat more
descriptive of the nature of the liability imposed." (citing James B. Ames, Law and Morals, 22
HARV. L. REV. 97, 97-100 (1908)). However, some commentators suggest that the terms differ in
that strict liability has affirmative defenses but that absolute liability has no defenses. See, e.g.,
Percy H. Winfield, The Myth of Absolute Liability, 42 L.Q. REV. 37, 51 (1926); Franck C.
Woodside III, et al., Why Absolute Liability Under Rylands v. Fletcher Is Absolutely Wrong!, 29
U. DAYTON L. REV. 1, 6 (2003).
In 1968, Wade offered a pragmatic solution to the vocabulary conundrum:
There are three expressions which are often treated as synonymous-"strict
liability," "liability without fault," and "absolute liability." Clearly, what is
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defects area and elsewhere.1 0 8 Today, strict liability is commonly
defined as "liability that is imposed on an actor apart from either (1)
an intent to interfere with a legally protected interest without a legal
justification for doing so, or (2) a breach of a duty to exercise
reasonable care, i.e., actionable negligence." 109
Modern strict liability is often based in common law, e.g., for
injuries caused by trespassing animals or the keeping of wild animals,
abnormally dangerous activities, 110 and products liability.' However,
it has counterparts in the modern statutory context as well, in areas
such as workers' compensation acts, 112 federal securities regulation, 113
and environmental regulations. 114 In these areas, the imposition of
statutory strict liability often mirrors the traditional common law
settings of strict liability. For example, the strict liability imposed

involved is not an insurer's liability. It is not accurate to call it "absolute." And
the term "fault" has so many meanings and connotations that arguments can
quickly be started as to whether fault is involved . . . . The expression, "strict
liability," is less definite and therefore less inaccurate or misleading and so, more
acceptable.
John W. Wade, The Continuing Development of Strict Liability in Tort, 22 ARK. L. REV. 233, 242
(1968).
The patent statutes have never incorporated any of these terms. "Liability without fault"
appears to be the best cognomen for the statutory standard of liability that attaches to direct
patent infringement. In any event, as discussed in Part III below, "strict liability" is a term
fraught with policy considerations and theoretical justifications that have no application to direct
patent infringement doctrine, so whatever term is adopted, it ought not to be that one.
108.
See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (1970); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW (1980); Guido
Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distributionand the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961);
Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055
(1972); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Richard A. Epstein, A
Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of
Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 681 (1980); Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A
Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1973); Gary T. Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the
Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA. L. REV. 963 (1981); Steven Shavell, Strict Liability v. Negligence,
9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980); Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and
Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965); Barbara Ann White, Economizing on the Sins of our
Past: Cleaning up Our Hazardous Wastes, 25 HOUS. L. REV. 899, 915-17 (1988).
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 27, § 75, at 534.
109.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
110.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
111.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).

§2

(AM. LAW INST. 1998);

See Jeremiah Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts, 27 HARV. L. REV. 235
112.
(1914) for a discussion of the development of these acts.
See Securities Act of 1933 §11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012), and § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2)
113.
(2012); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012).
See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42
114.
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2012).
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under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act 15 (CERCLA) for cleanup of hazardous waste
explicitly draws upon the common law's notion of strict liability for
injuries caused by abnormally dangerous activities, as well as
products liability. 116 Similarly, workers' compensation statutes, like
products liability doctrine, impose strict liability because, while the
defendant's activity is socially beneficial (e.g., the providing of jobs), it
carries substantial risks of injury that the legislature has deemed
should best be borne by the defendant."' As Prosser explained: "The
financial burden is lifted from the shoulders of the employee, and
placed on the employer, who is expected to add it to his costs, and so to
transfer it to the consumer."1 1 8
Again, it is worth pausing to note that these rationales offered
for strict liability-allocation of loss and risk-spreading in the context
of socially beneficial activities-do not apply to patent infringement
liability.
There is no sense in patent law that a defendant's
infringement may be a socially beneficial activity that will be tolerated
provided the defendant pays for the harm caused the plaintiff.
Indeed, patent infringement is routinely enjoined, at least where the
plaintiff is a practicing entity. 119
115.
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(2012)).
116.
See generally Lynda J. Oswald, Strict Liability of Individuals Under CERCLA A
Normative Analysis, 20 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 579, 598-603 (1993) (discussing legislative
history of adoption of strict liability standard in CERCLA). Section 101(32) of CERCLA provides
that the "standard of liability" under CERCLA is to be the same as that under section 311 of the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321, which has been interpreted by courts as being strict liability.
See, e.g., United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc., 589 F.2d 1310, 1312-13 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Bear Marine Servs., 509 F. Supp. 710, 713-14 (E.D. La. 1980) (dictum). See generally New York
v. Shore Realty Co., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) (discussing background of CERCLA's
strict liability standard and its derivation from the Clean Water Act).
117.
See Henry H. Foster, Statutory Strict Liability, 39 A.B.A. L.J. 1015, 1015 (1953)
("Since the upholding of the constitutionality of workmen's compensation acts, it is generally
accepted that there is legislative power to enact either tort or criminal strict liability statutes.");
Peck, supra note 37, at 235-36 ("[T]he enactment of workmen's compensation acts throughout
the United States reflects the conclusion that imposition of strict liability upon employers is an
appropriate way to deal with industrial accidents.") (citing 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING
JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 730-33 (1956); WILLIAM PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 554-58 (3d ed.

1964)). Gregory highlighted the statutory nature of strict liability in workers' compensation
statutes, stating: "Our legislatures have been far in advance of our courts about introducing and
frankly acknowledging the idea of absolute liability without fault," and noting that workers'
compensation statutes were the "most important legislative development" of this type." Gregory,
supra note 26, at 385; see also Wade, supra note 107, at 240 (stating that workers' compensation
statutes are "statutory in form and [do] not sound in tort, but ... accomplish the same result").
118.

WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 80,

at 531 (4th ed. 1971).

119.
A recent study indicates that, despite the Supreme Court's edict in eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006)-that injunctions should not issue automatically but
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In sum, the emergence of tort law in general, and the evolution
of strict liability in particular, in American law is a considerably later
development than the statutory creation of patent rights and statutory
imposition of liability without fault for infringement of those rights.
As long as direct patent infringement was viewed as a statutory
liability-without-fault regime, the two doctrinal systems did not
collide. The importation of the "strict liability" terminology into
patent case law in 1995, however, set the Federal Circuit on an
inevitable path toward doctrinal error, culminating in its ill-fated
2012 en banc decision in Akamai.
III. THE ADOPTION OF "STRICT LIABILITY" IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT
DOCTRINE

To recap, at the time Congress enacted the Patent Act of 1790,
the theories and rationales of tort law were not yet articulated. The
liability-without-fault standard of early patent law thus was not
grounded in tort doctrine and theory, but rather can be best viewed as
a natural consequence of the classification of patents as property and
the statutory exclusivity granted to the patent itself, and influenced
by the liability-without-fault standard that historically applied to
actions arising under the writ of trespass. 120 Throughout the tort
revolution of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, direct
patent infringement remained a statutory liability-without-fault
standard.
At no point has a US Patent Act employed the term "strict
liability," nor does the term appear to have been used by a
commentator to describe direct patent infringement before 1982.121
Furthermore, it was not until 1995 that the "strict liability" label was
first adopted by the federal courts. In Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v.
Warner-Jenkinson Co., the Federal Circuit noted that "[i]nfringement
is, and should remain, a strict liability offense." 122 Once articulated by
rather should be evaluated under a four-factor test-permanent injunctions issue in the "vast
majority" of cases involving practicing entities (although they are almost always denied to nonpracticing entities). See Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation
After eBay: An EmpiricalStudy, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 2006 (2016).
See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
120.
See, e.g., A. Samuel Oddi, Contributory Infringement/Patent Misuse: Metaphysics
121.
and Metamorphosis, 44 U. PiTT. L. REV. 73, 87 (1982) ("[D]irect infringement under section
271(a) ... is an intentional tort requiring knowledge on the part of the seller of the nonstaple of
its infringing use.").
62 F.3d 1512, 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17
122.
(1997); see also In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("Because patent
infringement is a strict liability offense, the nature of the offense is only relevant in determining
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the Federal Circuit, the strict liability label took hold quickly and, as
noted earlier, today courts 123 and commentators 12 4 routinely assert
that direct patent infringement is a strict liability offense.
Despite being the genesis of the strict liability label for direct
patent infringement, the Federal Circuit has seemed troubled in
recent years by the implications of applying this unforgiving standard
to various forms of direct patent infringement. The 2012 en banc
Federal Circuit opinion in Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight
Networks, Inc., 125 highlights the complicated relationship between
direct patent infringement and strict liability and underscores the
hazards of using imprecise or inapt vocabulary to define the
parameters of statutory patent infringement.
The 2012 Akamai en banc decision arose out of a critical gap in
statutory patent infringement provisions that has been accentuated by

&

whether enhanced damages are warranted."); Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 n.2 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) ("Infringement itself, however, is a strict liability offense . . . ." (citing WarnerJenkinson, 62 F.3d at 1527)). By contrast, strict liability made an earlier appearance in copyright
law. The Second Circuit, in a 1963 copyright infringement case, noted that courts and
commentators had complained about "the harshness of the strict liability principle in copyright
law." Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1963) (citing Barry
v. Hughes, 103 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1939)); Zecharaiah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of
Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 526-27 (1945); cf. De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408, 413 (2d
Cir. 1944) (L. Hand, J., dissenting)).
123.
See supra note 2.
124.
See supra note 3.
125.
692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam) (depublished), rev'd
remanded, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014), on remand, 786 F.3d 899 (2015), rev'd, 797 F.3d 1020 (2015)
(en banc) (per curiam). The 2012 Akamai en banc decision actually involved two combined cases,
each of which illustrated a somewhat different variation on the multi-actor patent infringement
theme. Id. at 1305. In Akamai, the defendant furnished instructions to its customers that
allowed them to undertake the missing steps needed to complete the claimed method at issue.
(The claimed method involved improved methods for storing webpage content and is described in
detail at 692 F.3d at 1333-34 (Newman, J., dissenting)). In McKesson Technologies, Inc. v. Epic
Systems Corp., the defendant undertook acts knowing-or substantially certain-that another
party would undertake additional acts that, when combined, would led to infringement of the
method patent at issue. 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 7531 (Fed. Cir. Apr.
12, 2011), rev'd en banc, 463 F. App'x 906 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (depublished), rev'd sub
nom Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (the claimed
method involved the use of personalized web pages to foster electronic communications between
healthcare providers and their patients, and is described in detail at 692 F.3d at 1335-36
(Newman, J., dissenting)). In both cases, the involved method necessarily contemplated the
participation of multiple parties in completing the steps of the claims, and thus both cases posed
the doctrinally difficult question of how a court should evaluate the potential liability of multiple
parties whose individual actions would have to be aggregated to form the acts necessary to
infringe a multi-step process or method claim. See Lynda J. Oswald, Simplifying Multiactor
Patent Infringement Cases Through ProperApplication of Common Law Doctrine, 51 AM. BUS.
L.J. 1, 3, 11-13 (2014) (defining multi-actor patent infringement).
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126
the growing prevalence of multi-step process or method patents.
Such patents are common, for example, in the medical diagnostics and
devices fieldl 2 7 and the cloud computing 28 sector. The Patent Act does
not address the complicated issue of assigning direct infringement
liability where various steps of a method or process patent are
performed by different parties, particularly parties who are co-equals
or who have no contractual or other type of relationship with each
other. 129
Over the past century the federal courts developed a complex,
and often conflicting, collection of standards and tests for addressing
the multi-actor infringement scenario. 130 The 2012 Akamai en banc
decision was an effort by the Federal Circuit to clarify the standard of
liability for such infringement, but the attempt failed, resulting in a
divisive 6-5 split with two dissenting opinions. All three opinions
explicitly addressed the "strict liability" standard of direct patent
infringement, suggesting that the Federal Circuit's discomfort with
this standard that it itself had articulated seventeen years earlier
drove the analyses. The majority opinion and one dissenting opinion
acquiesced to application of the strict liability label but sought to curb

This issue arises only in the context of process or method patents, as direct
126.
infringement of a process or method patent occurs only when all steps of the patented process or
method claim are performed. See, e.g., Canton Bio Med., Inc. v. Integrated Liner Techs., Inc., 216
F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000). A "process" patent is an operation or series of steps leading to a
useful result. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972) (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94
U.S. 780, 787-88 (1876)). A "method" is a series of steps for using a product to achieve a given
result. See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The
Patent Act specifically defines "process" to include "method." See 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2012).
See Tony Dutra, AkamailMcKesson Inducement Rule Affects Wide Range of
127.
Industries, Practitioners Say, BNA PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (Sept. 7, 2012),

[https://perma.cc/3SZXhttps://www.bna.com/akamaimckesson-inducement-rule-nl7179869600/
GEE9].
See Nicole D. Galli & Edward Gecovich, Cloud Computing and the Doctrine of Joint
128.
Infringement: "CurrentImpact" and Future Possibilities, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.

672 (2012).
The issue of the correct parameters of multi-actor patent infringement doctrine has
129.
been discussed by numerous authors and is not addressed further here. See, e.g., Nathaniel
Grow, Joint Patent Infringement Following Akamai, 51 AM. BUS. L.J. 71 (2014); Keith Jaasma,
Finding the Patent Infringement "Mastermind":The "Control or Direction"Standard for "Joint"
Infringement, 26 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 411 (2010); Mark A. Lemley et al.,
Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255 (2005); Mathew Lowrie et al., The Changing
Landscape of Joint, Divided and Indirect Infringement-The State of the Law and How to
Address It, 12 J. HIGH TECH. L. 65 (2011); Oswald, supra note 125; W. Keith Robinson, No
"Direction"Home: An Alternative Approach to Joint Infringement, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 59 (2012);
Sriranga Veeraraghavan, Joint Infringement of Patent Claims: Advice for Patentees, 23 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 211 (2006); Dolly Wu, Joint Infringement and Internet

Software Patents:An Uncertain Future?91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 439 (2009).
See Oswald, supra note 125, at 26-57 (discussing tests).
130.
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the outer reaches of such liability. However, the second dissent,
authored by Judge Newman, rejected the strict liability standard
altogether as inapposite to statutory patent law.
The en banc majority issued a per curiam opinion in which it
reiterated the Federal Circuit's earlier stance that "direct
infringement is a strict liability tort." 13 1 According to the en banc
majority, the Federal Circuit had not extended direct infringement
liability to instances where multiple unrelated parties undertook the
necessary steps of a process or method claim1 32 because of the court's
concern that the strict liability standard would lead to an overexpansive extension of liability, inappropriately "ensnar[ing] actors
who did not themselves commit all the acts necessary to constitute
infringement."

133

The majority then went on to find that it was not compelled to
address the liability of multiple actors for patent infringement under
the direct infringement provision of Section 271(a) of the Patent Act
because such cases could instead be resolved under the indirect
induced infringement provision of Section 271(b), which has a specific
intent element. 134 This intent requirement, the majority reasoned,
meant that there was less "risk of extending liability to persons who
might be unaware of the existence of a patent or even unaware that
others are practicing some of the steps claimed in the patent." 135 By
moving multi-actor infringement liability from direct to indirect
infringement, the en banc majority thus reduced the scope of liability
from a broad "strict liability" standard to a narrower "intent-based"
liability.
The hitch, however, is that both Supreme Court precedent1 36
and logic 13 7 dictate that indirect infringement must be supported by

direct infringement; indirect infringement cannot exist in isolation. In

131.
Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1307 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (en banc) (per curiam) (depublished), rev'd & remanded, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014), on remand,
786 F.3d 899 (2015), rev'd, 797 F.3d 1020 (2015) (en banc) (per curiam).
Id.
132.
133.
Id. (citing In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc)).
The en banc majority did concede, however, that strict direct infringement liability may attach
where the parties have "an agency relationship between the actors or some equivalent." Id.
134.
Id. at 1308 n.1. Section 271(b) provides: "Whoever actively induces infringement of a
patent shall be liable as an infringer." 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012).
135.
Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1308 n.1.
136.
Id. at 1308 (citing Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 526 (1972);
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 341 (1961); Henry v. A.B. Dick
Co., 224 U.S. 1, 12 (1912)).
137.
Id. ('"There is no such thing as attempted patent infringement, so if there is no
infringement, there can be no indirect liability for infringement.").
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addition, the Federal Circuit's own precedent in BMC Resources, Inc.
v. Paymentech 38 five years earlier had created "the single entity rule,"
which, in addition to stating direct infringement is a predicate to
indirect infringement, held that "liability for direct infringement
requires that a single party commit all the acts necessary to constitute
infringement."1 3 9 The conundrum facing the 2012 Akamai en banc
majority, then, was that it wanted to place multi-actor infringement
under the induced infringement umbrella (so as to avoid strict
liability), but doing so left the court with no direct infringer to support
the claim. The majority attempted to evade the issue by articulating a
tenuous and fragile distinction: "[A] party may be held liable for
inducing infringement even if none of the individuals whose conduct
constituted infringement would be liable, as direct infringers, for the
act of infringement that was induced." 140 In short, the majority found,
there could be an indirect infringer even in the absence of a direct
infringer-a stunning rewriting of precedent and doctrine in an effort
to avoid the strict liability standard.
Judge Linn wrote a dissent in the 2012 Akamai en banc
decision, in which three other judges joined. Those four dissenters
agreed that direct patent infringement is a strict liability offense. 141
However, they disagreed with the majority's re-categorization of
multi-actor infringement as indirect infringement under Section
271(b), arguing that the court lacked authority to revise the doctrine
of induced infringement to eliminate the predicate of direct
infringement required under existing Supreme Court precedent. 142
The Linn dissent would have left multi-actor infringement under the
umbrella of direct infringement 43 but would have employed BMC
Resources's "single entity rule" as a means for tempering strict
liability's more severe effects. 144

498 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007), overruled by Akamai, 692 F.3d 1301.
138.
Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1308.
139.
Id. at 1313. The majority saw this result as analogous to other areas of the law that
140.
would impose liability upon a party who uses an innocent third party to commit a tort, citing
examples of fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation, and odometer tampering. Id. at 1313-14
(citations omitted). The majority explained that nothing in the: language of either section 271(a)
or (b) specifies that "the act of 'infringement' required for inducement under section 271(b) must
qualify as an act that would make a person liable as an infringer under section 271(a))." Id. at
1314.
Id. at 1347 (Linn, J., dissenting).
141.
Id. at 1342 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305
142.
(2012)).
143.
See id. at 1347.
See id.
144.
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By contrast, Judge Newman's solo dissent tackled head-on and
in detail the ramifications of the Federal Circuit's strict liability
characterization of direct patent infringement.1 4 5 Judge Newman
asserted that direct patent infringement is not correctly labeled a
strict liability offense. 146 Rather, she maintained, strict liability is a
tort principle applicable to injuries arising from inherently dangerous
activities and has no place in patent infringement doctrine.' 4 7 This
mislabeling of the liability standard for direct patent infringement,
she argued, led the majority to incorrectly conclude that "every
participant in an interactive or collaborative method is fully
responsible for the entire harm caused by the infringement." 1 4 8 Judge
Newman supported her stance by citing favorably a 2002 law review
article by Blair and Cotter, who, she stated, properly recognized the
"inapplicability" of the strict liability standard to direct patent
infringement. 149
A close reading of that article reveals, however, that Blair and
Cotter did not completely dismiss the notion of direct patent
infringement being strict liability. Rather, they noted that direct
patent infringement is "often characterized" as a strict liability offense
and that "in some ways it is."150 But, Blair and Cotter cautioned,
direct patent infringement "is not strict liability in the purest sense, or
at least not in the sense in which the term is used in general tort
law."1 5 1 In the common law tort context, they noted, strict liability
normally arises as a result of unusually dangerous activities or
products liability. 152 In the statutory context of patent law, direct
infringement is a strict liability offense in that parties can be held
liable even if the infringement was unintentional or inadvertent, and

145.
Id. at 1319-36 (Newman, J., dissenting).
146.
Id. at 1331 ("Although the term 'strict liability' has crept into patentese, it does not
have the consequences given by my colleagues.").
147.
Id. at 1330.
148.
Id. (citing Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2065 n.2
(2011)). By contrast, she asserted, traditional tort law would apportion liability based on such
factors "as the relative contribution to the injury to the patentee, the economic benefit received
by the tortfeasor, and the knowledge and culpability of the actor," id. at 1331; this method, Judge
Newman reasoned, would work to appropriately limit liability to relevant parties in "multi-actor
patent infringement" cases as well, id. at 1332.
149.
Id. (citations omitted) ("[U]nder a true strict liability standard, damages would be
recoverable even before the accused infringer has 'knowledge or notice that the conduct
infringes."').
150.
Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and Its Alternatives in Patent
Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799, 800 (2002).
Id.
151.
Id.
152.
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the court will generally issue an injunction prohibiting further
infringement. 15 3
However, under the statutory provisions of the Patent Act,
damages are often available only once the plaintiff has been put on
notice of the patent (typically through "marking" of the product), 154
and damages are then awarded only for subsequent continuing
infringement.15 5 Blair and Cotter argued that true strict liability for
patent infringement would have no such "accommodation .

.

. for

unintentional infringement," and that direct patent infringement thus
was not a "pure" strict liability standard.15 6 Ultimately, Blair and
Cotter concluded that while "strict liability" may correctly describe the
liability imposed in some instances of direct patent infringement, the
term may be "misleading" in those other instances. 15 7 Their solution
to this dichotomy was a pragmatic one: "The standard of liability in
patent law simply is what it is and does not need a label."15 8
Although the Supreme Court's opinion in Akamai did not seek
to explain the 2012 en banc majority's creation of such a convoluted
rule for multi-actor patent infringement, comments of the Justices at
oral argument teased out the reason: housing multi-actor patent
infringement in direct infringement automatically triggers application
of liability without fault or intent under Section 271(a) of the Patent
Act, yet the Federal Circuit is uncomfortable with the inherent

&

Id. at 800-01.
153.
154.
See 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2012). Notice can occur through marking of the patented article,
or through other forms of notification to the alleged infringer of the potential infringement (e.g.,
filing of a lawsuit or a cease-and-desist letter). See id. The Federal Circuit has stated that section
287(a) "serves three related purposes: (1) helping to avoid innocent infringement; (2) encouraging
patentees to give notice to the public that the article is patented; and (3) aiding the public to
identify whether an article is patented." Nike v. Wal-Mart Stores, 138 F.3d 1437, 1443 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (citations omitted) (quoted in Blair & Cotter, supra note 150, at 804).
35 U.S.C. § 284(a).
155.
156.
Blair & Cotter, supra note 150, at 821. As Blair and Cotter went on to note, however,
section 287's provision regarding marking has no application in the context of a process patent,
where there is no product embodying the patent to be marked. Id. at 804 (citing Crystal
Semiconductor Corp. v. Tritech Microelectronics, Int'l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(citing Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng'g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1993))). Rather, in
that instance, "patent infringement is a strict liability tort in all relevant respects." Blair
Cotter, supra note 150, at 806. Blair and Cotter also note that marking provides constructive
notice but not necessarily "actual knowledge," and so "an 'innocent' defendant may still be liable
for damages, as under a true strict liability regime." Id.
Id. at 807, 807 n.21.
157.
Id. at 807. Blair and Cotter's primary purpose was to consider alternatives to the
158.
existing patent infringement liability scheme; they concluded that the current "modified" strict
liability scheme was preferable but that it should be coupled with refinements to the patent
marking system. Id. at 845.

1020

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. YJX:4:993

harshness of such liability. 159 Justice Scalia highlighted this at oral
argument when he called direct infringement under Section 271(a) "a
strict liability tort," 160 while noting that inducement of infringement is
not. Justice Kagan further underscored this point:
[T]he reason [the Federal Circuit] put this under 271(b) rather than 271(a) is
because of what Justice Scalia said, that 271(b) is not a strict liability offense ....
[T]hey thought they were being very clever by putting it into a 271(b) box and
avoiding the strict liability consequences of what they were doing ...
161

The Supreme Court unanimously reversed and remanded the
Federal Circuit's 2012 en banc decision in a short opinion, 162 finding
that the statutory language and structure, as well Supreme Court
precedent, mandated reversal of the Federal Circuit's holding that
inducement of infringement could exist even in the absence of direct
infringement by another party. 163 The Akamai Court did not address
application of the "strict liability" label to direct patent infringement.
In fact, recent Supreme Court opinions had avoided the term "strict
liability" in describing direct patent infringement liability. Instead,
the Court followed the practice of the early federal courts 164 in simply
outlining the direct patent infringement liability standard in
descriptive language that focused on lack of intent. For example, in
1999, the Court stated: "Actions predicated on direct patent
infringement .

.

. do not require any showing of intent to infringe;

instead, knowledge and intent are considered only with respect to
damages." 165 In 2011, the Court stated: "Direct infringement has long
been understood to require no more than the unauthorized use of a
patented invention.

. .

.

[A] direct infringer's knowledge or intent is

irrelevant." 16 6 However, less than a year after its decision in Akamai,
the Supreme Court abandoned this practice in Commil USA, LLC v.
Cisco Systems, 167 where it stated: "Direct infringement is a strict-

159.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs.,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014) (No. 12-786), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/
argument transcripts/12-786_i4dj.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9P7-ECYC].
Id. at 21.
160.
Id. at 23.
161.
162.
Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2120 (2014).
163.
Id. at 2115.
See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
164.
165.
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 645
(1999).
166.
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 761 n.2 (2011).
167.
135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015).
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liability offense." 168 It remains to be seen what the impact of the
Court's acquiescence in the "strict liability" label for direct patent
infringement will have on patent infringement doctrine.
The subsequent history of Akamai on remand reveals the
Federal Circuit's continuing conflicted position on strict direct patent
infringement liability. In May 2015, the panel on remand reiterated
"the well-established fact that direct infringement liability under
[section] 271(a) is strict liability." 169 This, the panel asserted, made it
impossible to "stretch" direct patent infringement liability to include
joint tortfeasor liability in the manner argued by the patentee as that
could result in holding strictly liable a party who had no knowledge
that its actions could be combined with another to result in direct
patent infringement. 170
Five months later, in August, 2015, the Federal Circuit once
again sat en banc in Akamai, this time vacating the panel decision to
hold that an entity is responsible for another's performance of method
steps if it directs or controls that other party's performance, or if the
actors form a joint enterprise.1 71 Unlike the 2012 Akamai en banc
decision, the 2015 en banc decision was unanimous. 172 The opinion
was short and did not refer to "strict liability." However, the Federal
Circuit's effort to place tight boundaries on the conditions under which
an actor could be held directly liable for patent infringement as a
result of actions undertaken by another party suggests that the
Federal Circuit remains both concerned with the broad net cast by
"strict" direct patent infringement liability and committed to cabining
the expansive direct patent infringement liability standard set forth
by Congress in the Patent Act.
IV. WHY DIRECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT Is NOT A "STRICT LIABILITY"
OFFENSE
Vocabulary
matters.
The manner in which courts,
commentators, and practitioners label concepts and causes of action
affects how they analyze and classify those concepts and actions.
Modern commentators and courts recite with rote certainty that direct

Id. at 1926 (citing Global-Tech, 563 U.S. at 761 n.2).
168.
Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 786 F.3d 899, 905 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
169.
Id. Hence, the panel held, the defendant was not liable for direct patent
170.
infringement as some of the necessary steps of the method patent were performed by another
entity whose actions could not be imputed to the defendant. Id. at 915.
Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. 797 F.3d 1020, 1022 (2015) (en banc)
171.
(per curiam).

172.

Three judges did not participate; the other nine were in agreement.
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patent infringement is a "strict liability" offense because that label
provides familiar-but ultimately inapt-shorthand for referencing
liability that is not based in fault or intent.
Even cursory consideration of the implications of the timeline of
Figure 1 exposes the inappropriateness of attaching this label to
statutory direct patent infringement.
In deeming direct patent
infringement to follow a "strict liability" standard in 1995, the Federal
Circuit implicitly (and likely, inadvertently) adopted theories of tort
liability that the drafters of the original patent acts would not have
known or considered, introducing an anachronism into patent
doctrine. It is this inexact and inappropriate use of a modern common
law tort notion-"strict liability"-in the context of a statutory legal
concept dating back to 1790 that caused the Federal Circuit to veer
off-path and attempt to create incorrect patent infringement doctrine
in the 2012 Akamai en bane.
"Strict liability" is not a neutral, descriptive term. Rather, the
term is replete with connotations of social policy choices and balancing
that may be appropriate within the case law context of products
liability or abnormally dangerous activities but which are incongruous
and inapposite in the statutory context of patent law. In labeling
direct patent infringement a "strict liability" offense, the Federal
Circuit has infused the gloss of later case law developments into the
statutory setting of patent law-and has brought all the historical
baggage that the "strict liability" label carries along with it. This has
two injurious consequences for patent infringement doctrine.
First, the adoption of the "strict liability" label for direct patent
infringement improperly inflates the courts' role in setting direct
patent infringement liability standards. Strict liability reached its
fullest flowering in the case law setting of products liability and
abnormally dangerous activities.
Its adoption in those settings
was driven by policy analyses and choices made by the courts and
backed by substantial scholarly commentary.
The use of the
strict liability label in the direct patent infringement setting
suggests-incorrectly-that direct patent infringement liability too is
a case law construct. Thus, when the 2012 Akamai en banc majority
felt that strict liability cast too broad a net of liability for multi-actor
patent infringement, it also felt free to create a new rule that would
narrow the scope of liability for this specific type of direct patent
infringement. After all, if the court is applying case law doctrine,
rather than statutory language, it can more easily alter that doctrine
to reach what is, in its view, the proper outcome.
However, direct patent infringement is, in fact, a statutory
construct.
Congress made the determination that direct patent
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infringement is a liability without fault, intent, or knowledge elements
in 1790, and Congress has held fast to that standard through all
subsequent patent statute revisions. Whether that liability standard
is draconian is not for the courts to determine; the courts' role is
merely to apply the language Congress has written, letting the chips
fall where they may in terms of the defendant's liability. If the
standard is too harsh, or ensnares too many actors, it is up to
Congress to fix the problem that its language has created. The
Federal Circuit's role is to give effect to Congress's manifested intent,
not to revise the statutory standard to fit its own notions of what is
fair, correct, or appropriate.
Second, the "strict liability" label improperly shifts the focus of
the patent infringement inquiry. When the early courts discussed
patent infringement as arising even in the absence of intent or
knowledge, this phrasing (properly) concentrated the legal analysis on
the language of the Patent Act and the statutory creation of the patent
right. The patent right was an absolute one, and anyone who intruded
upon it was an infringer.
The adoption of the term "strict liability" for patent
infringement, however, shifted the focus from the Patent Act's
expansive protection of the patentee's exclusive property interest in its
patent right to an inherently value-laden liability inquiry. Modern
strict tort liability, with its emphasis on social policy goals, 173 is a far
cry from the writ-based liability norms of the late 1700s. By the time
that the Federal Circuit first labeled direct patent infringement a
"strict liability" offense in 1995, "strict liability" had become a loaded
term in the legal lexicon; its development marked by extensive judicial
and scholarly commentary about the policy choices that dictate the
acceptance or rejection of this standard, particularly in the products
liability setting.
The policy considerations that underlie modern strict tort
liability have little or no relevance to direct patent infringement
doctrine. As illustrated in Figure 2, the traditional common law areas
of strict liability, such as abnormally dangerous activities or products
liability, balance the utility of socially desirable behavior by the
defendant against the harm caused to the plaintiff.

Four rationales are typically offered to justify imposition of strict liability: (1)
173.
fairness, (2) economic efficiency, (3) risk-spreading, and (4) deterrence. See, e.g., Oswald, supra
note 116, at 590-98.
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Utility of socially
desirable behavior
by Defendant

Harm to Plaintiff

FIGURE 2: BALANCING OF INTERESTS IN TRADITIONAL AREAS OF STRICT
LIABILITY

Prosser defined the balancing involved in identifying a strict liability
tort thus:
[Ilt is conduct which has so much social utility that it will not be treated as
wrongful in itself, and will not be prohibited or enjoined in advance, but not so
much that the defendant may be allowed to carry it on without liability at the
17 4
expense of actual damage to his neighbors.

As a society, we do not want to ban the behavior involved in a strict
liability tort altogether (the selling of products, for example, is a
societal good that cannot be easily foregone), but fairness and
efficiency dictate that we assign the defendant full liability for any
harm incurred by the plaintiff, regardless of the defendant's exercise
of care or lack of intent.17 5 The defendant can then spread the risk of
harm either through charging higher prices or obtaining insurance, 176
or can reduce the risk by refining its behavior.
By contrast, direct patent infringement has no such concept of
balancing. Rather, the Patent Act erects a fence around the rights of
the patentee to protect against intrusions by a third party. So strong
is the property interest at stake-the patent-that an incursion into
that interest by the defendant, regardless of intent or fault, is deemed
a legal wrong and will automatically give rise to liability.17 7 The social

174.
PROSSER, supra note 29, § 56, at 429.
175.
See Oswald, supra note 116, at 590-96.
176.
Id. at 596-97.
177.
Subject only to a limited and narrow range of defenses, none of which looks to the
social utility of the defendant's conduct. These defenses include, inter alia, patent invalidity,
inequitable conduct, patent misuse, and experimental use. See DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON
PATENTS § 19.01 (2016).
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utility of the defendant's behavior in infringing is simply never part of
the equation.
If we jettison the "strict liability" label in the patent
infringement context, we are left with the language of the Patent Act,
which describes a liability-without-fault standard (but without
attaching a label to such liability). Perhaps this standard is too harsh,
as the Federal Circuit seems to fear, or perhaps it is a fair mechanism
for protecting the limited monopoly created by the Patent Act and
granted to the patentee. Regardless, our analysis of the standard of
liability for direct patent infringement liability, and any argument for
revision of the statutory standard, should be grounded in an
understanding of the historical context of patent doctrine as compared
to tort doctrine and in a healthy respect for the role of Congress in
enacting the Patent Act. That understanding and that respect are
obscured by the convenient but inaccurate shorthand label of "strict

liability."
V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the terminology we use influences how we think
about legal doctrine. When the courts label direct patent infringement
a "strict liability" offense, they subtly but insidiously invoke policy
rationales that are an uneasy and inapt fit in patent doctrine. If we
step back and acknowledge explicitly the differences in the historical
development of patent and tort doctrine, we.can more easily see that
direct patent infringement is actually a statutory violation subject to a
statutory standard of liability-liability without fault, intent, or
knowledge. This liability standard does not carry the social and public
policy choices or value judgments inherent in the "strict liability" of
common law tort. By avoiding this inapt and malapropos moniker, we
are more likely to avoid doctrinally unsound outcomes, such as that
reached in the 2012 Akamai en banc decision. Discarding the strict
liability label for direct patent infringement would reframe the
analysis and debate, moving direct patent infringement liability out of
a policy framework and into its proper statutory setting. It would also
properly bound the judicial role and put Congress firmly in the
driver's seat in setting patent infringement liability standards, thus
honoring the respective roles of these co-equal branches of
government.

